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People often show enhanced memory for information that is central to emotional events
and impaired memory for peripheral details. The intensity of arousal elicited by an emo-
tional event is commonly held to be the mechanism underlying memory narrowing, with
the implication that all sources of emotional arousal should have comparable effects. Dis-
crete emotions differ in their effects onmemory, however, with some emotions broadening
rather than narrowing the range of information attended to and remembered. Thus, fea-
tures of emotion other than arousal appear to play a critical role in memory narrowing.We
review theory and research on emotional memory narrowing and argue that motivation
matters. Recent evidence suggests that emotions experienced prior to goal attainment or
loss lead to memory narrowing whereas emotions experienced after goal attainment or
loss broaden the range of information encoded in memory. The motivational component
of emotion is an important but understudied feature that can help to clarify the conditions
under which emotions enhance and impair attention and memory.
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Our most vivid and lasting memories are typically emotional
ones. These memories are selective, however. People show excel-
lent memory for information that is central to an emotional
event, but poorer memory for peripheral details. Memory nar-
rowing as a result of emotion has been demonstrated in numer-
ous studies but sources of controversy remain. Researchers dis-
agree about what constitutes central information versus peripheral
detail, about whether emotion always leads to memory narrow-
ing, and about underlying mechanisms. This review scrutinizes
theory and research on memory narrowing and questions the
common view that arousal is the primary mechanism underly-
ing this effect. Inconsistencies in the literature are discussed, and
alternative mechanisms are evaluated. We argue that several con-
troversies can be clarified by the view that the goals or motivations
associated with discrete emotions determine the breadth of cog-
nitive processing. Taking into account the motivational function
of emotions leads to a better understanding of when and why
emotions enhance and impair cognition.
EMOTIONAL MEMORY NARROWING
The terms “emotional memory narrowing” (Reisberg and
Heuer, 2007), “tunnel memory” (Safer et al., 1998), and “cen-
tral/peripheral trade-off” (Kensinger et al., 2007) all refer to the
finding that people tend to remember information central to, or
at the core of, an emotional event, and have poorer memory for
peripheral or background features of the event (e.g., Christian-
son and Loftus, 1991). Emotional memory narrowing has been
demonstrated most famously via the “weapon focus” effect. In
laboratory studies in which a crime is staged, witnesses tend to
focus on and remember the weapon used to commit the crime at
the expense of memory for details such as the perpetrator’s face
and clothing (e.g., Loftus et al., 1987; Kramer et al., 1990; Ste-
blay, 1992). The weapon, or immediate source of danger, is the
central and emotionally arousing stimulus whereas other infor-
mation, such as the perpetrator’s face or clothing, is peripheral to
the concern of remaining safe. Thus, emotion is associated with
the narrowing of attentional resources to a central threat at the
expense of peripheral or background details.
Considerable evidence for emotional memory narrowing has
been obtained in other laboratory-based studies as well (for
reviews, see Christianson, 1992; Mather, 2007; Kensinger, 2009;
Levine and Edelstein, 2009). For example, Christianson and Lof-
tus (1987) showed participants slides that depicted a traumatic
event (a boy getting hit by a car) or a neutral event (a boy crossing
a street) and tested memory for the slides later. Participants who
saw the traumatic event displayed better memory for central fea-
tures of the slides, but were worse at remembering which specific
slides they had seen, relative to those who saw the neutral event.
This suggests that people remember different aspects of events
depending on whether or not the events evoked emotion (also,
see Christianson, 1984; Christianson and Loftus, 1991). Similarly,
Kensinger et al. (2007) had participants view emotion-eliciting
objects (e.g., a snake) and neutral objects (e.g., a chipmunk) in
front of neutral backgrounds (e.g., a river). Participants showed
more detailed memory for emotional than neutral objects but
remembered backgrounds paired with neutral objects better than
backgrounds paired with emotional objects. Thus, emotion was
associated with enhanced memory for central information at the
expense of peripheral details.
Outside the laboratory, people have shown enhanced mem-
ory for central features of emotional events as varied as
natural disasters (Bahrick et al., 1998), physical injuries
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(Peterson and Bell, 1996), crime scenes (Reisberg and Heuer,
2007), and personal events that evoked shock, anger, and fear
(Berntsen, 2002). For instance, when asked to recount autobi-
ographical events that were highly emotional, people showed
enhanced memory for features that were integral to the events
and essential to their meaning but poorer memory for periph-
eral details that made no difference to the meaning of the events
(Talarico et al., 2009). In summary, a large body of research, both
inside and outside the laboratory, indicates that emotion induces
memory narrowing. Several unresolved issues remain, however.
These include the aspects of emotion responsible for memory nar-
rowing,whether all emotions lead to memory narrowing,and what
constitutes central information versus peripheral detail. We turn
to these issues next, reviewing approaches to emotional memory
narrowing that emphasize arousal, valence, and goal relevance.
EMOTIONAL AROUSAL AND MEMORY NARROWING
Emotional arousal, a physiological state that ranges from calm
relaxation to excitement and tension, is one of the major fea-
tures of emotion (Russell, 2003), and is commonly considered
to be the primary mechanism underlying memory narrowing. A
high level of arousal results from activation of the autonomic
nervous system and the release of stress hormones such as epi-
nephrine and cortisol, and can be measured by indices such as
heart rate and skin conductance. The view that emotional arousal
induces narrowing of attention and memory dates back to the
1950s. Callaway and Dembo (1958) showed that people given
stress hormones responded less to stimuli outside of their cen-
tral line of vision. Similarly, Easterbrook’s (1959) cue-utilization
hypothesis states that emotional arousal reduces the number of
cues that an organism can process at a time, decreasing attention
allocated to peripheral information. The greater the intensity of
arousal, the narrower the attentional focus. Because of this nar-
row focus, encoding of central information is enhanced, whereas
encoding of peripheral details is impaired (for reviews, see Reis-
berg and Heuer, 2007; Mather and Sutherland, 2011). This assists
organisms in reaching current goals by blocking out information
irrelevant to those goals (e.g., LaBar and Cabeza, 2006).
In addition to influencing attention and encoding, arousal has
been shown to promote consolidation of emotional information in
long term memory through activation of the amygdala (e.g., Cahill
et al., 1994; van Stegeren et al., 1998; Nielson et al., 2005; Dolcos
et al., 2011). Infusing norepinephrine directly into the basolat-
eral amygdala after the experience of emotional events enhances
long term memory for those events. Inactivating this region, using
lesions or drugs, attenuates memory enhancement (McGaugh,
2004, 2006). Stressful circumstances leading to cortisol release
prior to retrieval of an emotional event can also lead to more
pronounced memory narrowing relative to less stressful condi-
tions (Echterhoff and Wolf, 2012). Thus, arousal affects attention,
encoding, consolidation, and retrieval, and is thought to underlie
enhanced memory for central information and poorer memory
for information that is peripheral to the emotional event.
FINDINGS NOT EXPLAINED BY THE AROUSAL MODEL
Despite general agreement that arousal leads to memory narrow-
ing, inconsistent results have been obtained. Emotion has been
shown to enhance memory for both central and peripheral infor-
mation (e.g., Heuer and Reisberg, 1990; Cahill and McGaugh,
1995; Libkuman et al., 1999; Dutton and Carroll, 2001; Laney et al.,
2004), to impair memory for both central and peripheral infor-
mation (e.g., Morgan et al., 2004), and to enhance memory for
peripheral details (e.g., Fredrickson and Branigan, 2005; Talarico
et al., 2009). Moreover, the effect of emotion on memory narrow-
ing appears to be influenced by the valence of the event or stimulus
(e.g., Berntsen, 2002; Waring and Kensinger, 2009; Mickley Stein-
metz et al., 2010; van Steenbergen et al., 2011; Van Damme and
Smets, submitted).
The most frequently reported violation of the arousal model of
emotional memory narrowing is an enhancement of memory for
both central and peripheral information. Laney et al. (2004) asked
participants to view a series of slides that was rendered emotionally
evocative or emotionally neutral via voice narration. Relative to
participants in the neutral group, participants for whom the slides
were placed in an emotionally arousing context reported greater
subjective emotional intensity and showed greater physiological
arousal. They also displayed enhanced memory for both cen-
tral and peripheral features of the slides. Emotional arousal thus
improved overall memory accuracy. These investigators argued
that emotional memory narrowing may not occur without the
presence of an “attention magnet” – a shocking and salient sensory
stimulus such as a picture of a gruesome injury. They concluded
that memory narrowing may not be an inevitable effect of emo-
tional arousal but rather a byproduct of the type of shocking
sensory stimuli most typically used to study the phenomenon.
A second set of findings conflicts with the view that emotional
arousal enhances memory for central information by finding
general memory impairment. For example, soldiers undergoing
extremely stressful circumstances during military survival train-
ing (e.g., lack of food, sleep deprivation, and physical threats) were
worse at identifying the faces of their interrogators than soldiers
who underwent a less stressful interrogation (Morgan et al., 2004).
A meta-analysis on the effects of stress on eyewitness memory also
revealed that stress can impair memory for both the face of a
perpetrator and details of the crime (Deffenbacher et al., 2004).
In a spatial learning task, seeking monetary reward resulted in
better memory than avoiding electrical stimulation, except when
seeking reward led to high arousal (Murty et al., 2011). Thus, emo-
tional arousal can lead to deficits in memory accuracy, including
information of central importance to the emotion-eliciting event.
A third set of findings shows that emotional arousal can
enhance, rather than impair, memory for peripheral details. For
instance, Talarico et al. (2009) demonstrated that certain emotions
(e.g., surprise, happiness, and sadness) were associated with greater
recall of peripheral features of the emotion-eliciting events because
they promoted broader reflection on the event as a whole. In
addition, happiness and amusement have been found to enhance
memory for global features of stimuli rather than leading to nar-
rowing of attention or memory (e.g., Gasper and Clore, 2002;
Fredrickson and Branigan, 2005).
Finally, the extent to which emotion leads to memory nar-
rowing has been shown to vary depending on the valence of
the emotion. Waring and Kensinger (2009) showed participants
pictures of emotionally arousing objects placed within neutral
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backgrounds and pictures of neutral objects placed within neu-
tral backgrounds. The valence (positive, negative) and the level
of arousal (low, high) of the emotional objects were manipulated.
Background memory was generally worse for emotionally arous-
ing objects than for neutral objects, but the effect was weakest
for positive low arousal objects. After a 24 h study-test delay, a
central-peripheral memory trade-off remained only for negative
high arousal pictures, not for positive high arousal pictures or for
low arousal pictures of either valence (also, see Mickley Steinmetz
et al., 2010;Yegiyan andYonelinas, 2011). This suggests that valence
and arousal interact in determining the extent of emotional mem-
ory narrowing. Berntsen (2002) obtained similar findings with
respect to autobiographical memories, with accounts of shock-
ing events, but not happy events, containing more central than
peripheral information.
REASONS FOR INCONSISTENT FINDINGS
We have reviewed research showing that emotional arousal nar-
rows the range of information attended to and encoded in memory
as well as findings that contradict this view. To make sense of emo-
tional memory narrowing, and of results that violate this pattern of
findings, it is necessary to be more explicit about what constitutes
high versus low levels of emotional arousal, and what constitutes
information that is central as opposed to peripheral to an emo-
tional event. It is also necessary to consider mechanisms other than
arousal that may underlie accurate and lasting memory for central
information and poor memory for peripheral detail.
VARYING INTENSITIES OF EMOTION ACROSS STUDIES
One reason for inconsistencies in the findings is consistent with
the arousal model. The effect of emotion on memory may differ
depending on the degree of arousal, but “high arousal” is defined
very differently across studies. Many studies contrast memory for
stimuli or events that are deemed emotionally arousing versus
emotionally neutral. The stimuli and events defined as arousing,
however, range from relatively mild laboratory stimuli (e.g., Laney
et al., 2004) to real world events that evoke extreme levels of stress
(e.g., Morgan et al., 2004). Thus, emotion may enhance memory
generally when the level of arousal is relatively low, lead to memory
narrowing when the level of arousal is moderate, and impair mem-
ory generally when the level of arousal is extremely high (Baldi
and Bucherelli, 2005). To the extent that investigators neglect to
contrast increasing levels of arousal, and define high arousal dif-
ferently across studies, non-linear relationships between arousal
and memory would be difficult to identify.
VARYING DEFINITIONS OF CENTRAL AND PERIPHERAL INFORMATION
Another reason for inconsistencies in the findings concerning
emotional memory narrowing may be that definitions of central
and peripheral details vary widely across studies and theoretical
frameworks (Kensinger, 2009; Levine and Edelstein, 2009). Cen-
tral information has been variously defined as information that
is spatially (e.g., Christianson and Loftus, 1991), temporally (e.g.,
Strange et al., 2003), or conceptually (e.g., Peterson and Whalen,
2001) integral to the emotion-eliciting event or stimulus, or as
information that is relevant to the individual’s current goals (e.g.,
Levine and Edelstein, 2009). Information considered to be central
in one study may be viewed as peripheral in another. For instance,
in research on the weapon focus effect, the clothing of the perpetra-
tor holding the weapon may be considered spatially integral, and
hence central, due to its proximity to the weapon (e.g., Christian-
son and Loftus, 1991). Alternatively, clothing can be considered a
peripheral detail because it is distinct from the weapon or central
attention magnet (Laney et al., 2004) and has no significance for
the goal of avoiding threat (e.g., Levine and Edelstein, 2009).
In an effort to more clearly define “central” versus “periph-
eral” information, Mather and Sutherland (2011, 2012) proposed
the “arousal-biased competition” (ABC) model. According to this
model, emotional arousal enhances encoding of high priority
information at the expense of low priority information. Informa-
tion can attain high priority as a result of bottom-up perceptual
processes or as a result of top-down conceptual processes. For
instance, recent work on the ABC model has demonstrated that
when participants were exposed to a loud, arousing noise or to
negatively arousing images, they were more likely to recall per-
ceptually salient stimuli (high contrast symbols and letters) versus
less salient stimuli (low contrast symbols and letters), compared
to when they were exposed to a neutral noise or image (Lee et al.,
2012; Mather and Sutherland, 2012). The perceptual contrast of
the symbols and letters is an example of salience resulting from
bottom-up perceptual processes. In addition, the ABC model
posits that memory for information that is relevant to a per-
son’s goals will be enhanced whereas memory for information
that is not relevant will be impaired. This is an example of salience
resulting from top-down processes. Thus, this model holds that
emotional arousal enhances attention to, and memory for, infor-
mation that has high priority at the expense of information that
has low priority, regardless of whether the priority derives from
bottom-up processes (perceptual salience) or top-down processes
(goal relevance).
ALTERNATIVE MECHANISMS
As previously discussed, arousal is commonly viewed as the fea-
ture of emotion that leads to memory narrowing. However, a
third reason for inconsistencies in the findings concerning emo-
tional memory narrowing may be that features of emotion other
than arousal play an important role in determining the range
of information attended to and remembered. Investigations of
alternative mechanisms are scarce, however, and potential mech-
anisms are often confounded in research on emotional memory
narrowing. Turning again to studies of weapon focus, the sight
of the weapon elicits physiological arousal, negative affect, the
discrete emotion of fear, and the goal to protect the self from
harm. Memory narrowing may be due to any one of these fac-
tors or to a combination of factors. Yet few studies experimentally
manipulate one factor while holding other factors constant or
controlling for them statistically (e.g., Ritchie et al., 2006). Thus,
to account for findings that discrete emotions vary with respect
to the range of information encoded in memory (e.g., Berntsen,
2002; Waring and Kensinger, 2009), it is necessary to consider
other potentially important features of emotion. Two alternative
approaches are discussed which suggest that features of emotion
other than arousal influence the breadth of information attended
to and remembered.
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EMOTIONAL VALENCE AND MEMORY NARROWING
An alternative to the arousal model is the view that the valence
of an emotion determines the type of information processing in
which people engage and, as a result, the extent of memory nar-
rowing. Kensinger (2009) reviewed evidence that negative emotion
increases the processing and retrieval of sensory information, lead-
ing people to remember specific (central) details; in contrast,
positive emotion increases the processing and retrieval of con-
ceptual information, leading people to remember the gist of an
event. In other words, negative emotion induces a focus on local
details and therefore elicits a central-peripheral trade-off, whereas
positive emotion leads to broadening of attention and reliance on
gist or heuristics.
The affect-as-information model explains functions that may
be served by these differing information processing strategies
(e.g., Bless and Schwarz, 1999; Bless and Fiedler, 2006; Clore and
Huntsinger, 2007; Clore and Palmer, 2009). According to this
model, people use their affective state as a short-cut to infer their
evaluative reactions to a situation, and this influences attention
and memory. Negative emotion typically signifies that there is a
problem to solve, and therefore signals the need to carefully mon-
itor the environment for relevant information. Positive emotion
signifies a safe situation in which no problems require immediate
attention, so there is little need to focus on specific details. Hence,
negative emotion triggers narrow item-specific or stimulus-driven
processing, whereas positive emotion triggers broader relational or
knowledge-driven processing. Extending this approach, Fredrick-
son’s (1998, 2001) broaden-and-build theory holds that positive
emotions broaden people’s thought-action repertoires, promot-
ing activities such as play, exploration, and integration of differ-
ent types of information in the environment. This allows peo-
ple to establish and build enduring cognitive, behavioral, and
social resources. In contrast, negative emotions promote specific
action tendencies (e.g., withdrawal when feeling fear) and narrow
attention.
Empirical research on the attention broadening effects of pos-
itive emotion dates back to the 1980s. Isen et al. (1985, 1987)
showed that positive emotion (induced through watching amusing
film clips or receiving small gifts) enhances creativity and cogni-
tive flexibility. More recently, positive emotion has been shown
to enhance the accessibility of global information (Gasper, 2004),
to promote attention to peripheral features of visual stimuli (e.g.,
Wadlinger and Isaacowitz, 2006; Rowe et al., 2007), and to broaden
the scope of information encoded in memory (Gasper and Clore,
2002; Johnson and Fredrickson, 2005). For instance, Fredrick-
son and Branigan (2005) elicited positive, negative, or neutral
affect in participants and then had them perform a global-local
visual processing task (e.g., Navon, 1977; Kimchi and Palmer,
1982). Participants experiencing positive emotions (amusement
or contentment) displayed a global attention bias relative to those
experiencing neutral affect or negative emotions (anger or anxi-
ety). This effect is thought to occur early on in visual processing
(Kuhbandner et al., 2011).
Valence has also been shown to influence people’s suscepti-
bility to memory distortion and false memories. By promoting
heuristic processing, positive emotion can increase suggestibility
and susceptibility to incorporating misinformation into memory;
by promoting systematic processing, negative emotion can ren-
der people more resistant to misinformation (e.g., Bless et al.,
1996; Levine and Bluck, 2004; Forgas et al., 2005; Storbeck and
Clore, 2005; Kensinger and Schacter, 2006). In summary, although
both positive and negative emotion can be accompanied by phys-
iological arousal, some research indicates that negative emotion
leads to narrowing of the range of information attended to and
remembered, whereas positive emotion leads to broadening.
MOTIVATION OR GOAL RELEVANCE AND MEMORY
NARROWING
Despite incorporating one of the most crucial differences among
emotions, a focus on valence alone cannot account for some recent
findings. Even emotions of the same valence and the same level
of arousal have been shown to vary with respect to the range of
information attended to and the degree of memory narrowing.
Thus, a more complete understanding of the effects of emotion
on memory may require moving beyond arousal and valence to
consider the motivational state underlying discrete emotions (e.g.,
Sander et al., 2003; Larson and Steuer, 2009; Levine and Edel-
stein, 2009; Gable and Harmon-Jones, 2010b,c,d; Lench et al.,
2011; Harmon-Jones et al., 2012a,b). The goal relevance model
contains elements of both the arousal and valence approaches but
makes more specific predictions about the types of emotions that
should lead to memory narrowing. According to this model, the
motivational intensity (Gable and Harmon-Jones, 2010d) or goal
status (Levine and Pizarro, 2004; Levine and Edelstein, 2009) of
an emotion determines the degree of memory narrowing.
MOTIVATION AFFECTS ATTENTION AND MEMORY
A wealth of research supports the view that people’s goals affect
what they remember. Information relevant to a goal that has not
yet been achieved remains more accessible in memory than the
same information after the goal has been achieved (Förster et al.,
2005). People remember information exceptionally well if it is
framed in terms of enduring, universal goals such as survival (e.g.,
Nairne et al., 2008). In part, this occurs because people deliber-
ately prioritize information relevant to active goals, putting more
effort into encoding and retrieving it (e.g.,Adcock et al., 2006). But
memory enhancement for goal-relevant information also occurs
automatically even when people are not instructed to remember
the information or rewarded for doing so. In one study, partici-
pants showed enhanced performance on both an explicit memory
task and an implicit memory task (facilitated access in lexical deci-
sion) for words that had been assigned a high point value. They
also showed memory narrowing – poorer memory for the con-
text in which high reward words had been learned. This occurred
even though memory for words with high point values was not
rewarded and no instructions to remember those words were given
(Madan et al., 2012). Thus, consistent with prior research on the
effects of emotional arousal on memory (e.g., Mather and Suther-
land, 2011), these findings suggest that memory for goal-relevant
stimuli is enhanced and that this benefit can occur at the expense
of contextual details.
People’s goals differ depending on their developmental stage,
personality traits, and coping styles. In each case,memory serves an
adaptive function by retaining information that helps people reach
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their goals (Nairne et al., 2007). For example, older adults, who are
motivated to regulate emotion to promote well-being, attend to
and remember positive information more readily than younger
adults (Mather and Carstensen, 2005). People high in extraver-
sion and approach motivation (traits characterized by the goal
to approach positive outcomes) remember reward-relevant stim-
uli better, and recall more positively valenced autobiographical
memories, relative to people high in anxiety and introversion, who
remember more threat-relevant information (e.g., Derryberry and
Reed, 1994; Gable and Harmon-Jones, 2008; Denkova et al., 2012;
Study 3; Hicks et al., 2012). With respect to coping, people recall
self-enhancing information more readily than self-threatening
information (Taylor and Brown, 1988; Sedikides and Green, 2009)
and may selectively remember the past as worse than it actually
was in order to bolster the belief that they have improved over
time (e.g., Wilson and Ross, 2001; Ross and Wilson, 2003; Walker
and Skowronski, 2009). People with an avoidant attachment style,
characterized by the goal of avoiding intimate relationships with
others, display impaired memory for relationship-relevant words
on a working memory task (Edelstein, 2006).
This research shows that people’s goals, whether universal or
individual, systematically shape what they attend to and remem-
ber. Motivation is a critically important component of emotion
and may account to the effects of emotion on cognitive processing.
Goals associated with discrete emotions (e.g., the goal of avoiding
threat when feeling fear) may promote processing of goal-relevant
information and impair processing of information that is periph-
eral to the goal. Thus, motivation or goal relevance represents an
alternative mechanism that may account for emotional memory
narrowing.
THE CONTRIBUTION OF MOTIVATION TO EMOTIONAL MEMORY
NARROWING
According to appraisal theories, goals are at the heart of what it
means for an event to be emotional. People continuously monitor
the environment for information relevant to their current goals or
well-being (e.g., Scherer, 1998). They experience emotions when
they perceive a change in the status of a goal that makes it necessary
for them to modify their beliefs or plans. This motivational com-
ponent of emotion may contribute to memory narrowing. Levine
and Edelstein (2009) distinguish between pre-goal and post-goal
emotions. Pre-goal emotions such as desire, excitement, fear, and
anger, reflect appraisals that goal attainment or failure may occur
in the future but have not yet occurred or that goal-directed efforts
are ongoing. Post-goal emotions, such as happiness, contentment,
sadness, and grief, reflect appraisals that goal attainment or fail-
ure has already occurred. Gable and Harmon-Jones (2010d) make
a similar distinction when they refer to “motivational intensity.”
High motivational intensity is experienced when a person is driven
to approach or avoid specific stimuli in the environment because
goal attainment or failure is anticipated but has not yet occurred.
Because information processing capacity is limited, the infor-
mation most relevant to a person’s goals in a given context is likely
to be noticed and remembered, whereas less relevant information
is likely to be ignored or quickly forgotten. When motivational
intensity is high, it is functional to attend to and remember infor-
mation that is relevant to the active goal at the expense of less
relevant information. However, when goal attainment or failure
has already occurred, it is functional to attend to and remember a
broader range of information. This allows the person to take into
account the consequences of success or failure, change their beliefs
and expectations, and orient toward possible new goals. In other
words, emotions reflect the status of goals, and influence the scope
of attention and the range of information encoded in memory
accordingly. If goal attainment or failure is anticipated, the range
of stimuli attended to and encoded in memory narrows to central,
goal-relevant information. After goal attainment or failure, the
range of stimuli attended to and encoded in memory broadens to
incorporate more peripheral information. Importantly, according
to this model, even if pre-goal and post-goal emotions elicit simi-
lar levels of arousal, they should differ in their effects on attention
and memory. Moreover, valence only exerts an influence through
goal relevance or motivational intensity: People typically feel neg-
ative emotion when goals are threatened and positive emotion
when goals have been achieved. Nevertheless, both pre-goal and
post-goal emotions can be either positive or negative.
Although studies investigating the effects of emotional valence
on subsequent cognition typically assess positive emotion follow-
ing goal attainment (e.g., receiving a gift, watching amusing film
clips, recalling past successes), people also feel a range of posi-
tive emotions when they anticipate attaining goals (e.g., desire,
enthusiasm, excitement). A number of researchers, using different
terminologies, have described distinctions between pre-goal and
post-goal positive affective states, and have demonstrated that they
have different effects on subsequent cognition (Panksepp, 1998;
Knutson et al., 2000; Berridge, 2006; Knutson and Wimmer, 2007;
Levine and Edelstein, 2009). Berridge and colleagues distinguish
between “wanting” and “liking.” Wanting is associated with left
frontal and nucleus accumbens activation, along with the release
of dopamine, which enhances the desire to seek reward (e.g.,
Adcock et al., 2006; Knutson and Wimmer, 2007; Harmon-Jones
et al., 2008). Liking is associated with opioid stimulation, which is
related to feelings of pleasure following goal attainment (Berridge
and Robinson, 2003; Berridge and Kringelbach, 2008). Similarly,
Panksepp (1998) distinguishes between the seeking versus playing
emotive systems. Seeking aids goal-pursuit by narrowing atten-
tion to goal-relevant information (e.g., locating food or a mate).
Playing promotes exploration of new territory and affiliation with
others. Thus, pre-goal and post-goal positive emotions differ with
respect to neural activity, the functions they serve, and breadth of
processing.
Empirical studies support the view that pre-goal positive emo-
tions promote memory narrowing. Gable and Harmon-Jones
(2008) induced participants to feel either pre-goal desire or post-
goal happiness. This was done by having participants view a film
clip of delicious desserts or a humorous film clip. They found
that desire narrowed attentional focus relative to happiness in
global-local visual processing tasks. Other researchers found sim-
ilar results when the desire to approach objects was elicited by
displaying erotic stimuli (Moyer, 2004, unpublished study cited in
Reisberg and Heuer, 2004), or by displaying stimuli that evoke feel-
ings of nurturance, such as faces of human infants (Brosch et al.,
2008), and animal infants (Gable and Harmon-Jones, 2008). Gable
and Harmon-Jones (2011) also manipulated pre- and post-goal
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positive emotion within the same participants, and concerning
the same goal, by giving participants the opportunity to win
money in a game. Positive emotion experienced in anticipation
of winning led to narrowing of attention, whereas positive emo-
tion experienced after winning led to broadening of attention.
Importantly, this effect extends to memory. Relative to people
experiencing post-goal positive emotion, people experiencing pre-
goal positive emotion remembered words presented in the center
of a screen better than those presented peripherally (Gable and
Harmon-Jones, 2010b; for a review, see Harmon-Jones et al.,
2012a).
Just as not all positive emotions are associated with broad-
ening of attention and memory, not all negative emotions are
associated with narrowing of attention and memory. For instance,
von Hecker and Meiser (2005) found that people in a depressed
mood paid attention to, and later remembered, more irrelevant
as opposed to central information on a source monitoring task in
comparison to people who were not feeling depressed. Similarly,
Gable and Harmon-Jones (2010a) showed that sadness, an emo-
tion evoked by appraising goal failure as irrevocable, broadened
attention in global-local figures tasks. Sad participants responded
faster to global features of the figures than to details relative
to those in a neutral mood. Thus, evidence suggests that post-
goal emotion, whether positive or negative, broadens the range of
stimuli attended to and encoded in memory.
In contrast, pre-goal negative emotions, such as disgust, fear,
and anger, narrow attention, allowing people to concentrate on
current goals such as avoiding or eliminating potential threat
(Moons and Mackie, 2007; Levine and Edelstein, 2009; Gable
and Harmon-Jones, 2010a; Finucane, 2011). This closely mir-
rors the effects of pre-goal positive emotions, activating the same
brain regions and narrowing the range of stimuli attended to
and encoded in memory (Berridge, 2006). Amygdala activation,
previously assumed to be associated primarily with detection of
threatening stimuli, has also been linked with the elicitation of
pre-goal positive emotions such as desire and with the detection
of rewarding stimuli. This suggests that the function of the amyg-
dala can be viewed more broadly as preparing people to approach
or avoid specific goals or outcomes (Cunningham and Brosch,
2012).
SUMMARY
Approaches to understanding the effects of emotion on attention
and memory differ substantially in their predictions. The predom-
inant view in the literature is that when experiencing emotional
arousal, the range of stimuli attended to and encoded in mem-
ory narrows toward central information. Hence, any source of
emotional arousal should result in attention and memory narrow-
ing. Not all findings in the literature support this view, however.
Conflicting findings have led researchers to investigate mecha-
nisms other than arousal that may explain when and why emotion
enhances versus impairs cognitive processes. The view that emo-
tional valence determines the breadth of cognitive processing
explains some but not all recent findings. Even emotions of the
same valence and the same level of arousal have been shown to
vary with respect to the range of information attended to and
remembered (e.g., Gable and Harmon-Jones, 2010b). Taking into
account the motivational component of emotion helps to explain
inconsistent findings in the literature.
Recent evidence suggests that the effect of emotion on memory
differs depending on the goal status associated with the emo-
tion (e.g., Levine and Edelstein, 2009; Gable and Harmon-Jones,
2010d). When emotional arousal is elicited by the goal of pursu-
ing or avoiding a particular outcome, the range of details attended
to and encoded in memory narrows, with a focus on central or
goal-relevant information. In contrast, when emotional arousal
is experienced as a result of goal attainment or loss, the range
of details attended to and encoded in memory broadens, result-
ing in enhanced memory for more peripheral features of events
or stimuli. This broader perspective facilitates building on goal
attainment or adjusting to goal failure. In sum, pre-goal emo-
tions promote a narrow focus on information that will facilitate
goal attainment or prevent loss, shutting out irrelevant details.
Post-goal emotions help people adjust to goal attainment or loss,
and orient toward possible new goals, by broadening the range of
information attended to and remembered.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Previous research has focused largely on how arousal and valence
influence attention and memory. We have argued that investi-
gating features of emotion beyond arousal and valence yields a
more thorough understanding of how emotions influence atten-
tion and memory (Levine and Pizarro, 2004; Larson and Steuer,
2009; Levine and Edelstein,2009; Gable and Harmon-Jones,2010a;
Lench et al., 2011; Harmon-Jones et al., 2012b). In the future,
researchers should systematically vary the goal status of emotion
as well as examining the effects of arousal and valence on atten-
tion and memory narrowing (see Ritchie et al., 2006; Larson and
Steuer, 2009). In addition, varying the relevance of the informa-
tion to be remembered will help to determine whether information
relevant to current goals is enhanced at the expense of irrelevant
information.
Research is also needed on the extent to which the types of
information considered to be of central importance differ across
discrete emotions. Central information to a person feeling desire
might consist of rewarding and appetitive stimuli (e.g., Gable
and Harmon-Jones, 2008). Central information to someone expe-
riencing anger may be the perpetrator who is obstructing the
person’s goals (Levine and Pizarro, 2004). Threat-related infor-
mation may be central to someone experiencing fear (e.g., Lench
and Levine, 2005). Drawing on a motivational approach, one
would also expect pre- and post-goal emotional states to differen-
tially influence people’s susceptibility to false memories. Pre-goal
emotions should promote more careful and focused information
processing than post-goal emotions, decreasing the likelihood of
memory distortion for central or goal-relevant information. This
has yet to be examined and provides an interesting avenue for
further study. Finally, research examining neural correlates of emo-
tional memory has begun to shed light on the underlying mecha-
nisms involved in encoding and retrieving emotional information
(e.g., Adcock et al., 2006; Dolcos et al., 2011, 2012; Shafer et al.,
2011), and constitutes an important avenue for further research
distinguishing the effects of pre- versus post-goal emotions on
attention and memory. These are promising approaches that will
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help pinpoint how the motivational component of emotion shapes
memory, and more broadly, the conditions under which emotion
enhances versus impairs cognition.
CONCLUSION
The motivational component of emotion is an important but
understudied issue in the emotional memory narrowing literature.
Future research on how motivation and goal relevance influence
attention and memory will help clarify why, and under what con-
ditions, people attend to and recall different types of information.
Understanding the interaction between emotion and memory is
a fundamental issue in the field of psychology. People are faced
daily with the need to remember information while experienc-
ing a range of emotional states. An attorney angered by the acts
of opposing counsel, a patient saddened by a diagnosis, a res-
cue worker frightened by a disaster, must encode and retrieve
detailed information accurately if they are to make good decisions.
The link between people’s emotions and their goals provides an
important key to understanding the selective nature of memory
for emotional events. Arousal is an essential component of emo-
tion which certainly affects attention and memory. But people
frequently experience specific emotions such as happiness, desire,
grief, and fear at high levels of arousal, yet they differ with respect
to the types of information they are likely to attend to and the
scope of their memories. Thus, taking into account the goal sta-
tus and information processing strategies associated with discrete
emotions can provide a more complete understanding of how
emotion enhances and impairs cognitive processes.
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